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REMARKS BY DAVID A. WIRTH*
In a year of very dramatic change worldwide, there was at least one major oversight
in the environmental area. I am very sorry to report that no one ever thought to
prepare an environmental impact statement before taking down the Berlin Wall.
Actually that statement is considerably less outlandish than it might seem at first
blush. As old preoccupations have withered away, environmental issues have as-
sumed a new prominence internationally. For example, there is now serious talk of
environmental integrity as an essential component of national security. A global envi-
ronmental awareness is simultaneously growing so quickly as to strain the ability of
the international legal system to keep up. Indeed, developments in this area are so
rapid that they may very well be a paradigm that illustrates the potential of interna-
tional law generally well into the next century.
As a general matter, international legal standards in the environmental field are
often less developed than in other areas of international law, including some that have
been addressed by the previous panelists. The international community is now ab-
sorbed with the self-conscious process of creating environmental norms. Accordingly,
the most important developments in recent years, including last year, have been in the
creation of new law, as contrasted with the application of existing requirements. I
would like to report on developments in the lawmaking process in two broad areas:
(1) exports of hazardous substances; and (2) global atmospheric issues. While there
were important policy developments in both areas in the past year, I hope to empha-
size the significance of these developments for lawyers and the law.
International trade in hazardous wastes, toxic chemicals and dangerous pesticides
consumed a great deal of attention during the past year. The UN Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) sponsored a negotiation that led in March of last year to the adop-
tion of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.1 The negotiation of the Convention followed
very quickly upon a number of well-publicized, serious incidents in which private
firms headquartered in industrialized countries had shipped hazardous wastes to
Third World countries that were ill-equipped to handle the problems associated with
the treatment, storage and disposal of those wastes. Because of the heightened aware-
ness of the magnitude of the underlying problem, as well as the trade implications
involved in exports of hazardous wastes, the negotiations preceding adoption of the
Convention were significantly more acrimonious than previous international treat-
ment of this issue had been. As a result, the Basel Convention is substantially more
than a simple codification of existing law in this area. Rather, it is a major departure
from previously applicable law, both international and domestic. In fact, the Basel
Convention establishes a stricter regime for management of international shipments of
hazardous wastes than is in place in any one country.
The Basel Convention prohibits exports and imports of hazardous and other wastes
by parties to the Convention to and from nonparty states. Second, the Convention
bans shipments of hazardous and other wastes to parties that have prohibited imports.
At least in theory, a party to the Convention is assured of not receiving imports of
these substances from states of export that are also parties to the Convention merely
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by stating a desire to that effect. Third, the Convention establishes a prior informed
consent procedure for parties that have not prohibited waste imports. "Prior in-
formed consent" has become international shorthand for a notification and consent
procedure. In advance of shipment, the country of export notifies the receiving state,
which then has an opportunity to reject the shipment simply by declining to receive it.
Fourth, the Basel Convention requires that states of export prohibit shipments of haz-
ardous and other wastes if there is reason to believe that the wastes will not be man-
aged in an environmentally sound manner in the country of import. Last, the
Convention articulates an obligation for states of export to ensure that international
shipments of wastes are accepted for re-import if those shipments do not conform to
the terms of export.
Despite the fact that the Basel Convention goes so much farther than the law of any
one country, it has nonetheless been subject to severe criticism. One analytical per-
spective saw the Convention as legitimizing commerce in wastes, which should not be
condoned by international law. Others identified gaps in the Convention's coverage,
particularly in the areas of controlling trade and liability and compensation. Further,
there was criticism of the Convention's failure to require minimum international waste
management standards. As a result of these objections, no African country has signed
the agreement despite the fact that it was the concerns of African countries that led to
the agreement in the first place. The United States signed the Basel Convention ex-
actly a week ago, on the last day the agreement was open for signature. Because of the
lack of consensus surrounding it, the Basel Convention cannot truly be considered a
success. While in time the Convention may come to be widely accepted as articulating
an appropriate international legal standard, such a consensus does not now exist.
The past year also witnessed an important development in the regulation of interna-
tional trade in domestically banned and restricted industrial chemicals and pesticides,
such as DDT and Ajar. Like the hazardous waste trade, exports of chemicals and
pesticides have been a source of significant controversy for some time. Large export-
ing countries, such as the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom and Switzerland, have controlled the international debate until recently.
The result has been a series of weak instruments adopted by UNEP, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Food and Agricul-
ture Organization. Each of these earlier instruments confined the international stan-
dard to simple notification that these exported products were likely to leave the
United States or another country of export. These notices were not especially inform-
ative and, in many cases, in fact did not arrive until after the shipment.
In February 1989 there was a major breakthrough on this issue in the form of new
amendments to UNEP's London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on
Chemicals in International Trade. 2 The London Guidelines, like the Basel Conven-
tion, now set out a form of the principle of prior informed consent. The revised
London Guidelines specify that each potential country of import should be notified of
control actions with respect to banned and severely restricted chemicals and pesti-
cides. In addition, those countries should be provided with the opportunity to state
that they have decided (1) to permit use and importation of the chemical or pesticide;
(2) to prohibit use and importation; (3) to permit imports only under specified condi-
tions; (4) to request further information or assistance in evaluating the health and
2UN Doc. UNEP/WG.155/L.I Annex I (1987), adopted GC Dec. 14/27, 42 UN GAOR Supp. (No.
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amended GC Dec. 15/30, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 156, UN Doc. A/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 19
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safety implications of the substance; or (5) to permit or prohibit importation, with or
without conditions, on an interim basis until a final decision is made.
Unlike the Basel Convention, the London Guidelines constitute a nonbinding, prec-
atory instrument. Hortatory principles like the London Guidelines-in contrast to
binding multilateral treaties-are sometimes referred to as "soft"-as opposed to
"hard"-law. There is, moreover, a serious gap in the document. It establishes a
notification and consent procedure, but says nothing about what the proposed state of
export should do should a government of a country of import express its wish not to
receive particular chemicals or pesticides. There is an implied requirement that the
state of export should prohibit shipments that have not been consented to by the coun-
try of import, but this standard is not stated explicitly in the text of the Guidelines.
More than a year after their amendment, the revised Guidelines have not been imple-
mented by UNEP or by any of its member countries, including the United States.
A second major area of activity in the past year has been global atmospheric pollu-
tion. Within this category of issues, stratospheric ozone depletion has been a top pri-
ority. The primary mechanism for addressing this serious problem is the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. 3 This instrument was adopted
in 1987, again under the auspices of UNEP. The Montreal Protocol requires a 50-
percent reduction in consumption of eight chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), as well as another three chemicals called halons. That reduction is to be
accomplished by the end of this century. The 1987 Montreal Protocol is a compli-
cated and carefully structured regulatory regime, designed to deal with destruction of
stratospheric ozone in a comprehensive manner. In addition to the reduction sched-
ule, there are also trade incentives built into the agreement. Developing countries
receive special treatment to encourage them to become parties to the agreement and
ultimately implement its provisions. As an example of how delicate the balance is,
negotiations on the agreement broke down in 1985 and were revitalized only with the
discovery of the so-called ozone hole over Antarctica later in that year.
The Protocol is now widely viewed as insufficient to protect the ozone layer ade-
quately. Without the virtual elimination of the eight chemicals that are already cov-
ered by the agreement, as well as major reductions in another class of chemicals, the
ozone hole will persist perhaps well into the twenty-second century. As expressed at a
meeting in London attended by representatives of 124 nations in March 1989 and a
statement of eighty countries at the first meeting of the parties to the Protocol in May
1989,4 the need for reassessment of the Protocol is now generally accepted. The revi-
sion process, currently scheduled to be completed this year, will address the question
of accelerating the reduction schedule to eliminate emissions of the currently con-
trolled eight chemicals by the end of the century, as well as the inclusion of at least
two new chemicals: carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform. The reassessment
of the Protocol will also deal with the question of funding mechanisms to assist devel-
oping countries with the costs of complying with the Protocol.
This situation raises interesting issues for lawyers. The agreement itself provides for
periodic reviews, but does not precisely address the means of implementing the result-
ing revisions. Under customary international law, an amendment to a multilateral
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treaty is binding only on those nations that indicate their affirmative intent to accept
those new obligations, ordinarily through ratification of the amendment. One could
imagine that several of these iterations could result in the creation of different classes
of parties, each bound by a different configuration of amendments. The Protocol de-
parts from the ordinary rule by expressly specifying that "adjustments" to the agree-
ment's reduction schedule, which are binding on all states party to the instrument,
may be adopted by a two-thirds majority instead of by consensus. The precise mean-
ing of "adjustment" within the meaning of the Protocol, however, is not clear. It now
looks as if the parties to the Protocol will adopt an interpretation worthy of Solomon,
in which revisions to the reduction schedules for the eight chemicals now covered by
the agreement are subject to the nonconsensus adjustment process, but the addition of
new chemicals requires a full-blown amendment.
The equally compelling issue of global warming-the so-called greenhouse effect-
has also been the subject of considerable activity in the past year. The first step to-
ward international negotiations on a global climate treaty was taken with the estab-
lishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created under
the auspices of UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization, which met for the
first time in November 1988. The IPCC is now the principal ongoing multilateral
vehicle for scientific and policy treatment of the greenhouse issue.
Although the original scope of the IPCC's activities did not include preparation for
the adoption of a formal treaty, a number of recent directives clearly authorize the
negotiation of a multilateral greenhouse gas convention. These include the final state-
ment of an international meeting hosted by the Government of Canada in mid-1988, 5
two UN General Assembly resolutions, 6 the conclusions of a group of international
lawyers convened by the Government of Canada in February 1989,7 the declaration of
an international meeting attended by seventeen heads of state in the Hague in March
1989,8 a decision of the UNEP Governing Council taken at its May 1989 meeting, 9
the communiqu6 of the Group of Seven industrialized countries from their mid-1989
gathering, 10 and the declaration of a ministerial conference hosted by the Dutch Gov-
ernment in November 1989.11
5 The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security (statement from international meeting
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There has been a strong tendency to view the stratospheric ozone issue as a model
for global warming, both because of the similarity of the underlying problem and the
success of the Montreal Protocol. However, the recent international declarations of
intent are confined by and large to a so-called framework convention on the global
warming issue. This is a conscious reference not to the Montreal Protocol, but to the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 12 In examining recent
developments on the greenhouse issue, it is important to keep the Vienna-Montreal
precedent in perspective, particularly with respect to the timing and content of proto-
cols relative to the anticipated greenhouse gas convention.
States negotiating under UNEP auspices in the early 1980s to reduce threats to the
stratospheric ozone layer made an explicit decision to undertake a two-component
process. One product of this process was to be a "framework" multilateral convention
establishing an institutional basis for cooperation in research, exchange of information
and discussion of substantive policy measures. Protocols containing substantive regu-
latory measures would be appended to this convention. The ozone framework treaty
evolved into the Vienna Convention concluded in March 1985. The Vienna Conven-
tion itself contains no substantive requirements for specific measures to protect strato-
spheric ozone. Instead, it embodies only a vague, unenforceable exhortation to protect
the stratospheric ozone layer through the implementation of "appropriate measures."
Negotiations on a CFC protocol, which eventually became the Montreal Protocol,
proceeded simultaneously with deliberations on the Convention up to the adoption of
the Convention itself in early 1985. When negotiations on the CFC protocol broke
down, the Convention alone was adopted. Renegotiation of the protocol after a sched-
uled one-year "cooling off" period coincided with an upsurge in public concern about
the Antarctic ozone hole, which broke the deadlock and facilitated adoption of the
Montreal Protocol in September 1987.
Assuming the IPCC process achieves its stated goals, to a large extent it will have
established the "framework" mechanisms for exchange of information and coopera-
tion in research analogous to those institutionalized by the Vienna Convention. The
IPCC process will also have performed another function often ascribed to the Vienna
Convention: laying the groundwork for substantive action through preliminary dis-
cussions. In addition, the IPCC process serves very much the same function as the
one-year "cooling off" period that preceded renegotiation of the CFC protocol. These
considerations suggest that a greenhouse gas convention could be much more aggres-
sive than the Vienna Convention by, for instance, identifying global targets and dead-
lines for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Entirely consistent with the Vienna-
Montreal precedent, negotiations on ancillary agreements analogous to the CFC pro-
tocol could proceed simultaneously with convention negotiations.
These two broad areas-exports of hazardous substances and global atmospheric
pollution-are illustrative of some general trends in the area of international environ-
mental law, as well as some challenges for us as lawyers. First is the increasing reli-
ance upon multilateral forums for the resolution of international environmental
problems. Many of these issues have been around for a long time. Both the export of
hazardous chemicals and stratospheric ozone depletion were the subjects of domestic
legislative and administrative activity in the late 1970s. Recently there have been a
number of examples, including hazardous exports and stratospheric ozone depletion,
12S, Doc. No. 9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in [1990] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 21:3101; 26
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of good-faith, serious attempts to transfer issues into a multilateral context to foster
more effective and efficient international solutions to international problems.
A second trend is the increased emphasis on binding treaties in contrast to nonbind-
ing, hortatory, "soft" law instruments. For example, in the early 1980s the OECD
and UNEP adopted a series of nonbinding instruments on international traffic in haz-
ardous wastes. The motivation for the Basel Convention on hazardous wastes in-
cluded not only strong sentiment in favor of tightened standards for international
commerce in wastes, but also a widespread desire to replace existing precatory stan-
dards with binding legal obligations. The stratospheric ozone issue has already pro-
duced a binding multilateral instrument, and the greenhouse problem is expected to as
well.
A third general development is the increasing reliance upon very specific and com-
plex regulatory regimes that have measurable, crisp procedural and substantive stan-
dards for implementation by individual states. Although there have been some
notable exceptions, the tendency until fairly recently in the international environmen-
tal area was to establish rather vague adjective standards. Now, however, the Mon-
treal Protocol sets out a precise numerical reduction schedule with firm deadlines.
Both the Basel Convention, dealing with hazardous wastes, and the amended London
Guidelines, addressing chemicals and pesticides, describe detailed procedural
requirements.
Environmental problems raise many new challenges for international law. One ma-
jor issue, which nonetheless often goes unstated, concerns the ability of the interna-
tional legal system to respond to environmental risks of such overwhelming
magnitude and complexity as those presented by the greenhouse effect. Perhaps there
is a need for new nonconsensus decision-making procedures that may require states to
cede some of their sovereign prerogatives to some international institution. The
Hague Declaration adopted a year ago by no fewer than seventeen heads of state advo-
cates the creation of a new institution to exercise such powers. As already described,
the Montreal Protocol articulates a nonconsensus process that is nonetheless binding
on all parties for modifying some of that instrument's requirements.
Further, there are increasing demands for direct accountability to the public by
international legal processes. International procedures are often much less open or
transparent than corresponding domestic processes, at least in the United States.
Often on an ad hoc basis, some scientists, businessmen and representatives of nongov-
ernmental organizations have managed to carve out niches for themselves as observers
or even advisers to multilateral processes. Nonetheless practice among various inter-
national organizations and forums in this area is still very erratic. Industry and trade
unions have institutionalized roles in the OECD, but there is so far no opportunity for
representatives of public interest environmental organizations to participate in their
own right. Moreover, as issues such as hazardous exports and stratospheric ozone
depletion that were previously treated in domestic forums move to the international
arena, procedural rights of notice, an opportunity to comment and judicial review may
be attenuated or foreclosed.
Last, there is an increasing concern for full compliance and adequate enforcement
mechanisms. States undertaking major environmental obligations want to know that
their partners in multilateral agreements are in fact implementing the same require-
ments. There may be an opportunity here for a "private attorney general" model,
which has been very successful in the domestic environmental arena. Putting enforce-
ment tools in the hands of the public may partially overcome some of the impediments
inherent in cumbersome, often ineffective, dispute settlement mechanisms that states
may be reluctant to initiate.
REMARKS BY JOHN FRANKLIN HALL, JR.*
I shall briefly discuss the changing face of Eastern Europe and the climate for West-
ern business in the 1990s. Recent appeals by the leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union suggest that, politically at least, the climate for Western business
in the East is warm and inviting; but what are the legal and business realities for the
Western investor in this enigmatic region?
Using Poland and the Soviet Union as examples, I would like to take a moment to
highlight significant points in the host-country foreign investment laws. Poland and
the Soviet Union, like most of the former Soviet bloc nations have redrafted their laws
governing foreign investment during the past five years. In general, these laws guaran-
tee the foreign investor's share against expropriation and encourage foreign invest-
ment and participation in a variety of industries. Regarding ownership and control,
Poland allows outright foreign control of ventures, while the Soviet Union seeks to
retain domestic control in practice, though its laws do not mandate such control. Tax
holidays exist to varying degrees for many East European countries. In Poland, most
companies receive a three-year tax holiday, while ventures in the agro-industrial, tech-
nology and tourism sectors are given tax exemptions for twice that period. The
United States currently has no tax treaty with the Soviet Union, so tax holidays are
generally limited to the three years provided in the Soviet Joint Venture Law,
although treaty negotiations may soon be underway to avoid the double taxation of
American ventures, and the withholding tax on dividends that other Western nations
are exempt from.
Repatriation of the foreign investor's profit is usually subject to certain restrictions
in East European countries. Upon ratification of the Trade and Business Treaty
signed last Wednesday by President Bush and Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Poland
will allow unfettered repatriation of hard currency profits. Similarly, the Polish Gov-
ernment has agreed to gradually eliminate all restrictions on zloty profit repatriation
by the mid-1990s; currently, only 15 percent of zloty profits may be exported. Export
of hard currency profit from the Soviet Union, however, is subject to two major re-
strictions: (1) the profit must derive from the company's export earnings; and
(2) there remains a 20-percent withholding tax for U.S. partners.
In addition to the various laws that speak directly to foreign investment or joint
ventures, Western investors must be aware of bureaucratic realities and legal infirmi-
ties that exist in almost all East European states. In many East European countries a
dearth of available or understandable commercial and contract laws, to the extent
they exist at all, presents unique challenges and potential pitfalls for Western investors
accustomed to relatively straightforward and widely disseminated rules of the game.
Additionally, bureaucratic reticence on many levels, a lack of basic comprehension of
market and business fundamentals, and inefficient modes of distribution, communica-
tion and transportation can serve to frustrate the potential investor, or even his
attorney.
Among the frustrating vagaries of trade with the nations of Eastern Europe are
matters of currency convertibility and countertrade. As of 1990, the Polish zloty be-
came internally "convertible," but this theoretical conversion will likely not translate
into practical conversion for some time. Much has been reported about the efforts,
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